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I. INTRODUCTION
The application of the antitrust laws to high-tech industries is a
timely subject. Both the Federal Trade Commission ("Commission")
and the Antitrust Division ("Antitrust Division") of the Department of
Justice have recently brought a number of cases, in both the merger and
nonmerger areas, involving firms in high-tech markets. Although the
Microsoft2 and Intel3 cases have engendered most of the public's
attention, they are only the most visible examples of recent federal
antitrust enforcement involving high-tech products. Recent FTC
antitrust actions challenged patent pools used to fix prices, frauds on the
* Director, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission.
** Assistant Director, Office of Policy and Evaluation, Bureau of Competition, Federal
Trade Commission. The authors would like to thank James Mongoven for his generous as-
sistance in the preparation of this article.
1. Private parties have also been active recently in bringing antitrust cases involving
high-tech and intellectual property issues. See, e.g., Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innova-
tions, Inc., 129 F.3d 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Lab. Corp., 117 F.3d
1137 (10th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
2. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., Civ. Ac. No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. May 18, 1998)
(complaint); New York v. Microsoft Corp., Civ. Ac. No. 98-1233 (D.D.C. May 18, 1998)
(complaint).
3. See In the Matter of Intel Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 9288 (June 8, 1998) (complaint).
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patent procurement process,4 abuses of standard setting processes,S
mergers that would result in an anticompetitive accumulation of power
over innovation markets,6 and other anticompetitive practices that would
deny consumers the important benefits of innovation.
Although the antitrust laws apply to all industries,7 the application
must be tempered in each case by the myriad ways in which competition
can be modified by structural, behavioral, technological, regulatory, and
other characteristics. The Commission applies the antitrust laws with
sensitivity to the special characteristics of high-tech industries and of
intellectual property, but also with the recognition that-as in other in-
dustries-competition plays an important role in spurring innovation
and in spreading the benefits of that innovation to consumers. This fo-
cus is not new. This balanced approach has roots that go back at least to
the 1977 Antitrust Guide to International Operations in the Ford Ad-
ministration and the 1988 Antitrust Guidelines for International
Operations in the last year of the Reagan Administration, and is set forth
in the 1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Prop-
erty four years ago. It is also informed by the extensive hearings and
detailed reporting by the Commission three years ago on antitrust in the
21st century. 8
Of course, enforcement in this area is not entirely free from contro-
versy. A few critics question whether the antitrust laws that were
originally designed to apply to traditional manufacturing and distribu-
tion industries should be applied at all to competition in fast-moving
industries where products often are quickly outmoded and market share
4. See In the Matter of Summit Technology, Inc., 1999 F.T.C. LEXIS 23 (1999).
5. See In the Matter of Dell Computer Co., C-3658 (May 20, 1996) (consent order)
(Commissioner Azcuenaga dissenting).
6. See In the Matter of Glaxo plc, C-3586 (June 14, 1995) (consent order); Hoechst
AG, C-3629 (Dec. 5, 1995) (consent order), Novartis AG, C-3725 (April 10, 1997) (consent
order).
7. All industries are subject to the antitrust laws unless exempted by a federal regula-
tory scheme. See e.g., Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-1721 (1994). The
exemption must be specific, however, as "[r]epeals of the antitrust laws by implication from
a regulatory statute are strongly disfavored, and have only been found in cases of plain re-
pugnancy between the antitrust and regulatory provisions." United States v. Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963). In one anomalous case, the Supreme Court held in
1922 that baseball was not in interstate commerce and was thus beyond the reach of the
antitrust laws. See Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Prof I Baseball
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). Congress partially repealed this exemption in 1998.
8. See Anticipating the 21st Century: Competition Policy in the New High-Tech, Global
Marketplace-Volume I, Federal Trade Commission Staff Report (May 1996)
<http/l:www.fte.gov/opp/global.htm>.
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may be ephemeral.9 Others express concern about the potential conflict
between the antitrust laws and the laws that protect intellectual prop-
erty.'" Are monopolies granted under U. S. patent laws fundamentally in
conflict with the "antimonopoly" focus of the Sherman Act and later
antitrust statutes? Can intellectual property rights coexist with effective
antitrust enforcement?
It. UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF HIGH-TECH INDUSTRIES
The most obvious criticism of antitrust enforcement as applied to
high-tech industries starts with the notion that these are fast-moving
industries in which today's technology is quickly outmoded, opening
the way for new competitors to overturn the dominance of incumbents.
If those generalizations were uniformly true of high-tech markets, then
surely antitrust enforcement would be less important. Except for price-
fixing and other per se violations, antitrust ought to leave such markets
alone, for any effort to create or exercise market power would quickly
be corrected by market forces.
Of course, experience shows that this caricature of high-tech mar-
kets is true in some cases and false in others. For example, even in an
innovation-driven market, dominance in one generation may enable a
firm to gain exclusive control over critical inputs, such as software ap-
plications, allowing monopoly power to be carried over from generation
to generation regardless of the relative superiority or inferiority of the
incumbent's later generation products." In addition, large sunk costs,
high risks, and other entry barriers may mean that while product char-
acteristics change rapidly, the identity of the dominant players may be
unchanging for long periods of time.'2
While it is true that rapidly evolving technology may, in many cir-
cumstances, erode entrenched interests, there may also be
countervailing tendencies that strengthen monopoly power. For in-
stance, the networking effects present in many high-tech industries can
lead to a winner-take-all market with very limited opportunity for any
9. See David J. Teece and Mary Coleman, The Meaning of Monopoly: Antitrust Analy-
sis in High-Technology Industries, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 801 (1998); Robert J. Barro, Why
the Antitrust Cops Should Lay Off High Tech, BUSINESS WEEK, Aug. 17, 1998, at 20.
10. See, e.g., Ward S. Bowman, Jr., PATENT & ANTITRUST LAW: A LEGAL & EcoNoAIc
APPRAISAL (1973); William F. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Mo-
nopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267, 275 (1966).
11. See Jeffrey Church and Neil Gandal, Network Effects, Software Provision, and
Standardization, 40 J. INDUS. ECON. 85, 97 (1992).
12. See Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner, Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation,
Product Preannouncements, and Predation, 76 Am. EON. REv. 940, 942 (1986).
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firm to compete with the dominant network. 3 Regulatory barriers, as in
the need for FDA approval of pharmaceuticals, may mean that new en-
trants arrive only very slowly regardless of the sophistication of the
underlying technology. And, of course, patents or other intellectual
property may play a role-not as something for antitrust to condemn,
but as a fact of life in a particular market, like economies of scale or
large sunk costs, that makes entry unlikely, slow, or insufficient.'
A key aspect of the role of antitrust enforcement in high-tech mar-
kets, and an area in which criticism of that enforcement is most
vigorous, concerns the seeming conflict between intellectual property
rights and federal antitrust laws. There may in fact be a lot less conflict
or even potential for conflict than this issue implies. Intellectual prop-
erty is a form of property. Through the years antitrust enforcement has
shown respect for the property rights of factory owners in the land on
which their factories sit, the bricks and mortar or steel and glass of
which those factories are built, the expensive machinery that operates
inside those factories, and the products that they produce for sale. But if
the only two factory-owners, the only two producers, in a particular
market decided not to compete, but instead contributed their factories to
a partnership that sold the combined output at a single price set through
a formula, the Commission's respect for their property rights wouldn't
stop it for long from enforcing the antitrust laws to the fullest extent.
The Commission's job is to prevent the use of that property in an anti-
competitive and unlawful fashion.
If that scenario concerning real. property were translated into the
patent context, one would have the situation the Commission faced in its
recent challenge to the patent pool between Summit Technology and
VISX, the only two FDA-approved manufacturers of lasers used in
photo refractive keratectomy ("PRK"), a vision disorder treatment.' 5 The
Commission complaint charged that both companies had the intellectual
property and other assets to enter the market as independent competi-
tors, but instead formed a patent pool and used it to fix prices.
Rather than compete on price, the two firms agreed to charge a $250
licensing fee that was paid into the pool each time laser eye surgery was
performed using either firm's equipment. The proceeds of the pool were
split according to a formula. The result was that prices were far higher
13. See Michael Katz and Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Com-
patibility, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 424,437 (1985).
14. See McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1495 (11th Cir. 1988)
(patents or the lack thereof are relevant to a determination of entry barriers); accord West-
man Comm'n Co. v. Hobart Int'l, Inc., 796 F.2d 1216 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 486
U.S. 1005 (1988).
15. In the Matter of Summit Tech., Inc., 1999 F.T.C. LEXIS 23 (Feb 23, 1999).
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than they would have been if the two firms had been competing with
each other, as each had originally planned. As the popularity of the pro-
cedure grew, so had the extent of consumer injury, estimated at some
$30 million per year in 1997.
Of course, the analogy between real property and its intellectual
counterpart is not perfect. With tangible property, it is often fairly
straightforward to determine whether the parties stand in a competitive
or complementary relationship. If they sell in the same market and to
the same customers, and if their customers treat their products as sub-
stitutes, that is a pretty good clue that they are competitors. This issue is
sometimes less straightforward with intellectual property, because when
the complex licensing relationships between the two parties are scruti-
nized, it may be more accurate to describe their relationship as
complementary rather than competitive. The basic rule, enunciated in
the Intellectual Property Guidelines, is that a relationship is horizontal if
the parties would have been actual or likely potential competitors absent
a licensing relationship between them.'6 For example, if they each have
blocking patents, so that neither could lawfully produce a product with-
out a license from the other, the relationship is vertical. Once again, this
is not so different from tangible property. If two factory owners are
buying physical inputs from each other, closer investigation might re-
veal that neither could have a final product without the cooperation of
the other. It may turn out that such a relationship also is best described
as complementary rather than competitive.
But, as the Summit case shows, it would be a mistake to conclude
that antitrust should stay out of the way just because the relationship
involved intellectual property. In that case, the evidence showed that the
companies were true competitors. Each had the intellectual property and
other assets to enter the market independently. Thus, their relationship
was a competitive one rather than a complementary one, and the pool
eliminated substantial competition that could otherwise have occurred.
It is true that the parties could argue that, notwithstanding the underly-
ing merits, they really were afraid of litigation, and the pool was a way
to avoid that litigation. But that argument goes too far. Once it is shown
that, as a matter of objective fact, the parties could have competed with
each other absent the license, there is an anticompetitive effect to be
weighed in the rule of reason balance. Concerns about avoiding litiga-
tion, however real, are but an efficiency to be weighed against that
effect. In that weighing, of course, the Commission needs to take into
account whether the restraint was reasonably tailored to accomplishing
16. See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GUIDELINES § 5.5.
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the efficiency, or whether instead there were practical and substantially
less restrictive alternatives. In this case, a simple cross-license at no or
low royalties would have avoided litigation without the substantial harm
to competition that resulted from the price floor set by the pool.17 To
remedy this harm, the Commission accepted for public comment a con-
sent order settling the patent pooling part of the case."
The approach the Commission took to the Summit case provides an
interesting contrast to the cases in this area from the early and middle
parts of this century. Early in this century, the Supreme Court exempted
from antitrust scrutiny a pooling arrangement that amounted to outright
price-fixing, with no transfer of technology or other efficiency at all.' 9
Later on, the courts swung in the other direction to condemn intellectual
property licensing arrangements, as when the Supreme Court struck
down a patent pooling agreement on price-fixing grounds, even though
the patents apparently were blocking]l
Similar problems infected the antitrust treatment of intellectual
property outside the patent pooling area. For example, the courts fre-
quently inferred market power from the existence of a patent or
copyright, without weighing the significance of substitutes for the pat-
ented technology or copyrighted material.2  Additionally, the
government's infamous "Nine No-No's" articulated a highly restrictive
view of permissible licensing practices.2
Fortunately, enforcement of the antitrust laws no longer begins with
the assumption that restrictive use of intellectual property is necessarily
anticompetitive.' Current enforcement starts with three basic assump-
tions about intellectual property. First, intellectual property is
17. See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GUIDELINES § 2.3 ("[c]ross licensing... can facili-
tate integration of the licensed property with complementary factors of production. This
integration can lead to more efficient exploitation of the intellectual property, benefitting
consumers through the reduction of costs and the introduction of new products").
18. In the Matter of Summit Tech., Inc., 1999 F.T.C. LEXIS 23 (Feb. 23, 1999).
19. See Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902).
20. See United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948). In cases where the in-
tellectual property portfolios of various companies may hamper entry, the agencies are
always aware that "licensing may promote the coordinated development of technologies that
are in a blocking relationship." Intellectual Property Guidelines § 2.3.
21. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969); Crown
Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24 (1923).
22. The "Nine No-Nos" were intellectual licensing practices that were sure to attract the
attention of the Justice Department in the 1970s. See Bruce B. Wilson, Patent and Know-
How License Agreements: Field of Use, Territorial, Price and Quantity Restrictions, Address
Before the Fourth New England Antitrust Conference (Nov. 6, 1970).
23. For a history of the changing nature of federal enforcement of the antitrust laws in
the intellectual property area, see Willard K. Tom and Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust and
Intellectual Property: From Separate Spheres to Unified Field, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 167
(1997).
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essentially comparable to other forms of property, so that ownership
provides the same rights and responsibilities. Second, the existence of
intellectual property does not automatically infer that market power is
conveyed on the owner. Third, the licensing of intellectual property may
often be necessary in order for the owner to efficiently combine com-
plementary factors of production, and thus may be procompetitive. 24
1I. THE ROLE OF ANTITRUST IN HIGH-TECH INDUSTRIES
The current enforcement protocol is good news for intellectual
property owners because it means an end to the long history of antago-
nism between antitrust and intellectual property. Of course, this does not
mean that intellectual property can never be the foundation of a monop-
oly. Nor does it mean that acquisitions of intellectual property, or
contracts relating to such property, are necessarily any less (or more)
anticompetitive than similar transactions involving tangible property.
Indeed, a number of recent FTC actions involving intellectual property
help make the point.
A. Anticompetitive Acquisitions
A long line of antitrust cases holds that acquisitions of patents can
be used to acquire or maintain monopoly power." In several recent
merger cases, the Commission considered the acquisitions of patents
and related technology where the merging firms were either the only
two, or two of only a few, firms capable of innovating in high-tech mar-
kets. In such situations, the acquisition would lead to almost certain
anticompetitive effects. As Areeda and Hovenkamp note:
the clearest case [of exclusionary conduct] would be the acqui-
sition 'of an equivalent patent covering the only known
economic alternative to the monopolist's product or process.
Such an acquisition forecloses potential competition by rivals
who might otherwise have access to that patent. Even the acqui-
sition of one out of several equivalent patents might have
exclusionary effects.26
24. See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GUIDELINES § 2.
25. See, e.g., In re Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 103 F.T.C. 467 (1984); United States v.
Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963); Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th
Cir. 1952).
26. 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 707b, at 175
(rev. ed. 1996).
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Attacking anticompetitive acquisitions of intellectual property in
high-tech industries uses traditional concepts in an area that the FTC,
and others, have recently come to understand as vitally important to a
competitive American economy. In industries where the main focus of
competition is the development of new technologies rather than price
competition, antitrust principles will apply and that competitive rivalry
must be protected. If too much of the ability to innovate in a relevant
market is accumulated in one entity, and substitutes are lacking, com-
petition may suffer. The Commission's "goal is to carefully identify
those situations where a merger will reduce innovation competition."
This approach to the acquisition of intellectual property rights is re-
flected in the Commission's enforcement decisions involving mergers
of pharmaceutical firms. In Glaxo, the Commission alleged harm to in-
novation markets where the merging parties--Glaxo and Burroughs
Wellcome-were the two firms farthest along in developing an oral
drug to treat migraine attacks.# Current drugs existed to treat migraines,
but they were available only in injectable form and were not sufficiently
substitutable to be included in the relevant market. Both Glaxo and the
acquired firm, Wellcome, competed to develop the new drugs, and the
expectation was that the drugs would compete with each other after they
were developed. Barriers to entry, based on the necessity to acquire sub-
stantial specialized human capital resources, and the necessity of
completing the FDA approval process, were high. The complaint al-
leged that after the merger Glaxo could unilaterally reduce output in the
relevant market by decreasing the number of research and development
effortsto develop a noninjectable drug. It would have the incentive to
do so because the remaining research effort would presumably produce
a monopoly product until the third-best effort could complete the FDA
approval process some years hence.
The consent order settling this case required the divestiture of Well-
come's worldwide research and development assets for non-injectable
drugs. Divestiture as a remedy in innovation markets requires special
care because the success of research and development efforts often de-
pends on a complex array of expertise and sustained knowledge. It may
be necessary to require on-going obligations beyond divestiture to as-
sure that the purchaser has some probability of successful completion of
the research effort. 29 In Glaxo, for example, the order imposed signifi-
27. William J. Baer, New Myths and Old Realities: Perspectives on Recent Develop-
ments in Antitrust Enforcement, Address Before the Association of the Bar of the State of
New York (Nov. 17, 1997).
28. See Glaxo, supra note 6.
29. See 3 AREEDA & HOvENKAMP, supra note 26, 707i, at 184 (advocating
"divestiture of sufficient assets to create viable new forms with free access to the monopo-
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cant obligations on Glaxo to assist the acquirer in its efforts to continue
the research and development effort successfully. Glaxo had to provide
information, technical assistance, and advice to the acquirer about the
R&D efforts, including consultation with and training by Glaxo em-
ployees knowledgeable about the project. The divestiture was a success
in this case since both Glaxo and the acquirer of its intellectual property
now have oral migraine drugs on the market. With the required assis-
tance from Glaxo, the acquiring firm, Zeneca, received complete FDA
approval in only 15 months.
In Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz, another pharmaceutical merger case, the
Commission alleged a market for the development of gene therapy
products, despite the fact that there were no such current products li-
censed by the FDA." The complaint noted that the first products would
not be available until the year 2000, but that the market could grow to
$45 billion by the year 2010. The technology at issue involves the
treatment of disease through manipulation of genetic material and in-
sertion or reinsertion into a patient's cells. Although there were many
firms doing pioneering research into gene therapies for various disease
states, the merging firms were two of only a few entities with the intel-
lectual property rights and other assets necessary for commercialization
of such therapies. The firms' combined position in gene therapy re-
search was so dominant that other firms doing research in this area
needed to enter into joint ventures or contract with either Ciba-Geigy or
Sandoz in order to have any hope of commercializing their own research
efforts. Competition between the two firms made possible such ventures
or contracts on reasonable terms. Without competition, the combined
entity could appropriate much of the value of other firms' research,
leading to a substantial decrease in such research. In addition, there was
direct competition between the two companies with respect to specific
therapeutic products.
The remedy in this case was designed to protect competition both in
the particular products in which the two firms competed and the broader
market for gene therapy research and development. For the specific
therapeutic products of the two firms, the order requires the licensing of
certain key intellectual property rights held by the combined firm, and
also requires that an acceptable buyer be identified "up front." Rhone
Poulenc Rorer was identified as the licensee before the order was ac-
cepted by the Commission. For the broader gene therapy research and
development market, the order required the companies to grant gene
list's then-existing technology .... where an acquisition, or a series of acquisitions, has
probably made a substantial contribution to monopoly power.").
30. See Novartis AG, supra note 6.
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therapy researchers non-exclusive licenses to certain essential gene
therapy technologies that would otherwise have provided a bottleneck to
the research of others.
B. Abuse of the Standard Setting Process
Antitrust enforcement also can play a constructive role in the stan-
dard setting process. Standard setting is a collaborative activity found in
many high-tech industries that has significant procompetitive potential.3'
Where network effects are prevalent consumers often benefit from
widespread adoption of a standard.32 Efforts to select a single standard
therefore can enhance the innovation and efficiency of an entire industry
to the benefit of consumers. However, abuse of the standard setting pro-
cedure can have anticompetitive effects, as the Commission found in the
33Dell Computer case.
Dell involved a standard designed for the Video Electronics Stan-
dards Association ("VESA") for a local bus to transfer instructions
between a computer's CPU and its peripherals. There would be consid-
erable efficiency-enhancing potential in a product that would let
computer and peripheral manufacturers know how to make products
compatible with one another. The agreement on the standard was prem-
ised on representations by the participants that no firm held intellectual
property rights that might block others from developing towards the
standard. The anticompetitive potential of the standard setting activity
surfaced when Dell Computer alleged that the new standard infringed
on its patent, despite twice certifying, along with other members of the
Association, that it had no intellectual property conflicts. Dell made its
claim only after the bus was highly successful, and its claim for royal-
ties gave it effective control of the standard. If Dell had provided
information on its patent claim up front, the participants could have
made an informed choice on using the Dell technology. Because Dell
instead resorted to its patent ambush, its actions were anticompetitive.'
31. See David Balto and Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust and High-Tech Industries: The New
Challenge, 43 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 583 (1998); Yale Braunstein and Lawrence white,
Setting Technical Compatibility Standards: An Economic Analysis, 30 ANTITRUST BULL.
337 (1985).
32. The increasing returns that a dominant network enjoys, along with lock-in and other
network effects, may make market power more durable. See FTC Staff Report, supra note 8,
Ch. 9 at 3 ("the combination of demand-side scale economies and consumer switching costs
may render dominance of a firm in control of an interface standard unusually enduring and
give reason for more careful attention to anticompetitive practices.").
33. See Dell Computer Co., supra note 4.
34. The Commission's position in this case is entirely consistent with the condemnation
found in the patent law for surprise assertions of patents, which can lead to equitable estop-
pel against the party asserting infringement. See, e.g., Wang Lab. v. Mitsubishi Elec. Am.,
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Dell's belated assertion of patent ownership in this case enabled it
to exercise market power. The Commission's complaint specifically
alleged that industry acceptance of the new standard was delayed and
that uncertainty about the acceptance of the design standard raised the
cost of implementing the new design. Other firms avoided using the
new bus because they were concerned that the patent dispute would re-
duce its acceptance as an industry standard. In addition, willingness to
participate in industry standard setting efforts was chilled.
The consent order requires that Dell refrain from enforcing its pat-
ent against any computer manufacturer using the new design in its
products. In addition, Dell is prohibited from comparable behavior in its
future standard setting involvements.
C. Fraudulent Procurement
Fraudulent procurement of intellectual property almost always leads
to anticompetitive effects. This is not a new area of the law for the
Commission. Over thirty years ago, the Commission successfully chal-
lenged a cross-licensing arrangement between American Cyanamid and
Pfizer for the sale of tetracycline. 5 The Commission found that the pat-
ents had been procured by fraudulent behavior that included suppressing
of material information and misrepresentation of material facts, and that
the subsequent cross-licensing and sale of the drug constituted illegal
monopolization in violation of section 5 of the FTC Act.
In attacking the fraudulent procurement of patents, of course, the
Commission is not attacking the patent system. Just the opposite. The
Commission's actions in these cases help protect the system in which
patent examiners must rely on truthful representations by inventors
seeking patents. Where that standard is not met, and a potential monop-
oly is wrongfully awarded, antitrust enforcement is appropriate.
The Commission's laser eye surgery case involves such a charge.
The complaint charges that VISX obtained one of its key patents
through a pattern of fraud and inequitable conduct, and asks that VISX
be enjoined from enforcing its patent.36 More specifically, the complaint
alleges that VISX intentionally withheld from the Patent and Trademark
Office highly material "prior art" that might prove that the claimed in-
vention was not patentable because it was already known to others in
Inc., 103 F.3d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Pitney Bowes Corp., No. 95-
1806-JO,1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, (D. Or. Mar. 23, 1998).
35. See American Cyanamid Co., 72 F.T.C. 623 (1967), affd sub nom. Charles Pfizer &
Co., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 401 F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1968).
36. See In the Matter of Summit Tech., Inc. (Mar. 17, 1999) (No. 9286) (complaint)
available at <http:/lwvwv.ftc.gov/osl1998/9803/summit.cmp.htm>.
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the field. Although Summit and VISX have agreed to abandon the pat-
ent pool as part of their settlement with the Commission, the charge of
fraudulent patent acquisition against VISX continues in administrative
litigation. In June 1999, the administrative law judge rejected the
fraudulent patent procurement charge against VISX. The Commission
staff is appealing that decision to the full Commission.
One interesting issue that came up in that litigation was whether
VISX would be allowed to defend that charge by attempting to show
that the fraudulently procured patent had no competitive effect, because
other patents might have prevented any potential entrant from compet-
ing in the market. In other words, VISX cleverly sought to make it the
government's burden to exclude the possibility that other patents might
legitimately have given it some measure of market power over its prod-
uct. The Commission successfully opposed this motion before the
administrative law judge as contrary to well-settled monopolization
law.37 But the motion also was highly impractical. What VISX proposed
to do was to turn a fairly straightforward inquiry into the circumstances
surrounding the acquisition of the one patent into a huge and unwieldy
patent infringement trial that would try to resolve whether each and
every of several potential entrants-each with somewhat different prod-
ucts and technology-had infringed or would infringe a large number of
VISX patents that were otherwise not at issue in the case. Moreover, the
relief sought in the case was to enjoin enforcement of the fraudulently
procured patent. If other patents validly would have prevented other
firms from entering the market, VISX would be free to enforce those
patents even after an order enjoining enforcement of the fraudulent pat-
ent. Thus, VISX would not be harmed in any way by excluding the line
of argument and supporting evidence.
The administrative law judge correctly determined that this ap-
proach did not make any sense. In so ruling, the judge was squarely in
the mainstream of antitrust jurisprudence, which holds that unjustified
conduct that tends to maintain a monopoly, even if it cannot be shown
to have an immediate effect on price or output, violates section 2 of the
Sherman Act."
37. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); Lorain
Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410
U.S. 366 (1973); Mahone v. Addicks Utility Dist. of Harris County, 836 F.2d 921 (5th Cir.
1988). See also 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAIP, supra note 26, 706f, at 168 ("ITIhe § 2 offense
is established by showing that the procured patent made some contribution to that power. It
need not be shown that the patent itself conveyed substantial monopoly power.").
38. See, e.g., American Tobacco, 328 U.S. at 836; Lorain Journal, 342 U.S. at 153.
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D. Maintaining Monopoly Power in a High-Tech Industry
Perhaps one of the most notable recent enforcement actions in the
high tech area was the Commission's complaint against Intel, filed in
June 1998, which alleged that Intel retaliated commercially against
customers who had patents that they either sought to enforce against
Intel or refused to license royalty-free to Intel.3" This conduct, according
to the complaint, tended to maintain Intel's monopoly power by, among
other things, reducing the competitive threat posed by the existence of
important technology not under Intel's control or available to it. The
case was resolved on the eve of trial in March 1999 and the Commission
issued a proposed order settling the charges.
The Intel case involved the difficult question of what tactics a mo-
nopolist may use to maintain its monopoly. Intel, as you know, makes
general purpose microprocessors, the brains of personal computers that
process system data and control other devices integral to the system. It
is a market that has expanded dramatically each year for more than a
decade and in which product generations are measured in months, not
years. Despite this fast growth and high rate of innovation, Intel has
managed to maintain a market share of approximately 80% of dollar
sales. Barriers to entry are high due to sunk costs of design and manu-
facture, substantial economies of scale, customers' investments in
existing software, the need to attract support from software developers,
and reputational barriers.
The microprocessor market has several unique features. Computer
design and manufacture requires complex coordination between a num-
ber of different disciplines, almost always spread among many different
firms. Microprocessors, memory components, core logic chips, graphics
controllers, various input and output devices, and software must all
work effectively with each other in order for the final product to work.
To achieve effective integration, computer manufacturers require prod-
uct specifications and other technical information about each
component, and they require such information in advance of designing
the computer in order to test and debug to insure the reliability and per-
formance of each component and the system as a whole. This
information is provided by all component makers, including Intel, sub-
ject to formal nondisclosure agreements. This information sharing has
substantial commercial value to both sides of the agreement, the com-
ponent makers and the computer OEMs.
The Commission complaint charged that Intel suspended its tradi-
tional information sharing with three customers-Digital Equipment
39. See In the Matter of Intel Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 9288 (June 8, 1998) (complaint).
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Corporation, Intergraph Corporation, and Compaq Computer Corpora-
tion-in order to force those customers to end disputes with Intel
concerning the customers' asserted intellectual property rights and to
grant Intel licenses to patented technology (not just microprocessor
technology) developed and owned by those customers. Digital and
Compaq capitulated quickly and entered into cross-license arrangements
with Intel. Intergraph was able to resist only because it succeeded in
obtaining an injunction against Intel's conduct in a federal court.4°
Intel's conduct reinforced its dominance of the general purpose mi-
croprocessor market in at least three ways. First, Intel's alleged conduct
would give it access to technology being developed by others in the in-
dustry, disadvantaging other microprocessor manufacturers who are
trying to challenge Intel's dominance. Second, forcing other fimns to
license away fights to their proprietary technology would dull the in-
centive to innovate, thus harming competition in several ancillary
markets. Third, Intel's forced acquisition of technology from computer
OEMs reduces the ability of those OEMs to support a non-Intel micro-
processor platform by taking away an OEM's proprietary technology
that could have been used to market its machines. Thus, Compaq would
be much less able to support an AMD or Digital microprocessor system
by advertising its own nonmicroprocessor technology because Intel has
forced Compaq to license that other technology and Intel could in turn
license it back to other OEMs that support an Intel microprocessor plat-
form.
The proposed order remedies all of the concerns in the Commis-
sion's complaint. It prohibits Intel from withholding or threatening to
withhold certain advance technical information or microprocessors from
a customer for reasons relating to an intellectual property dispute with
that customer. This requirement is limited to the types of information
that Intel routinely gives to customers to enable them to use Intel mi-
croprocessors, and it does not impose a "compulsory licensing"
requirement in the first instance. The order allows companies in dis-
putes to continue to receive relevant information except where the
customer elects to seek an injunction against Intel's manufacture, use,
sale, offer to sell, or importation of its microprocessors. The order is
also careful to protect Intel's legitimate intellectual property rights. Intel
will not be required to continue providing information or products with
respect to the microprocessors that the customer is seeking to enjoin. In
addition, Intel may withhold information for legitimate business rea-
sons, such as a breach of the disclosure agreement.
40. See Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 3 F.Supp.2d 1255 (N.D. Ala. 1998).
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The Intel settlement is important to maintaining competition in sev-
eral areas. It defines as an abuse of monopoly power the use of that
power to extract proprietary, legally-protected intellectual property from
potential competitors. Absent this rule of law, a dominant firm in a high
tech industry could use its current market power to extend its domi-
nance to complementary products and to next generation products. For
instance, as the selling of PCs becomes more commoditized, there is a
danger that an unchastised Intel could own the only valuable brand in
the industry, which would be "Intel inside." Thus, Intel might come to
dominate an even larger market than microprocessors.
Chairman Pitofsky's statement on the issuance of the proposed con-
sent summed up its importance:
The heart of the Commission's complaint against Intel was the
principle that a monopolist cannot withhold products or infor-
mation about products in order to retaliate against customers
who find themselves in an intellectual property dispute. We
recognize that there is an essential balance to be struck between
protecting the incentives of smaller rivals to innovate and un-
duly constricting a dominant firm's conduct of its business. The
settlement would fully resolve those competitive concerns with-
out interfering with Intel's legitimate business activities. This is
the result that the staff would have sought after a full and suc-
cessful trial.4"
The Commission's complaint, filed in June of 1998, has been the
subject of some considerable debate, some informed, some less so. Any
intelligent discussion of the case and the proper role of antitrust en-
forcement in high-tech requires a basic understanding of what the case
involves and what it does not. The criticism of the case contains two
pretty basic legal mischaracterizations.
First, some have suggested that a case such as the Commission's
action against Intel represents an attack on the intellectual property
laws. Nothing could be further from the truth. Rather, the complaint ad-
dresses allegations that Intel has used commercial retaliation and the
threat of retaliation to force others to surrender their patent rights and
deprive those third parties of a forum to adjudicate those rights. In other
words, the issue presented by the case is whether a monopolist can use
its power to deprive others of their intellectual property rights.
It is true that one of the means of retaliation alleged in the com-
plaint is Intel withholding of technical information from customers
about its products. But it is important to remember, as the complaint
41. Press Release, March 17, 1999.
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states, that the information in question was information Intel ordinarily
gave to its customers to design computer systems incorporating Intel
microprocessors, not information that could be used to help microproc-
essor competitors. This involves no technology exchange or patent
cross-license. It is the technical "how to" information computer manu-
facturers need to make a microprocessor work in their products.
Without this information, the cut-off customers were at a real competi-
tive disadvantage. Withholding the "how to" was the functional
equivalent of withholding the microprocessors themselves. The com-
plaint alleges that the exclusionary behavior ended only when these
firms agreed to license their inventions to Intel.
Actions of this sort are particularly threatening and exclusionary be-
cause of the importance of patent protection to innovative technologies
in their incubation period. In a market where the patent system is the
only protection that breakthrough technologies have to protect the fruits
of their research from the reaches of the monopolist, such actions send a
powerful message that it is not worth the time, effort and expense to
innovate in order to compete with the dominant firm. This inevitably
tends to reinforce or maintain the dominant firm's monopoly power.
A second, and related, concern some have expressed is that the
Commission's action seeks to force compulsory licensing of Intel's pat-
ents to its competitors. Even a cursory reading of the Commission's
complaint and proposed order shows that suggestion to be seriously
misleading. If the Commission prevails, all Intel will be prevented from
doing is, in the words of Judge Posner, "retaliat[ing] against customers
who have the temerity to compete with him, by cutting such customers
off.''42 The order would prohibit unjustified discrimination between
similarly situated customers and not allow a monopolist to cut off cus-
tomers solely because they are also competitors. Where, however, Intel
had "legitimate business considerations," such as evidence of misuse or
misappropriation of its inventions, the company would be free to protect
its rights. The case, and the relief sought, focus on exclusionary conduct
by an alleged monopolist that injures rivals and lacks a legitimate busi-
ness justification.
Some have argued that the FTC's case cannot succeed unless the
evidence shows that the monopolist's action somehow had a further ef-
fect on prices or output. That argument seriously misstates the law,
which clearly prohibits monopolists from engaging in activities that en-
trench or preserve their monopoly position. As Justice Scalia had
observed, the antitrust laws require that we examine the actions of a
42. Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 376 (7th Cir.
1986).
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monopolist "through a special lens: [b]ehavior that might otherwise not
be of concern to the antitrust laws ... can take on exclusionary conno-
tations when practiced by a monopolist."43 By definition, a monopolist
charges a monopoly price and produces just enough output to maintain
that price. When a monopolist improperly maintains that monopoly po-
sition, there is no immediately measurable increase in anticompetitive
effects. Prices do not go up and output does not fall. It is competition
that would have brought change and dynamism. Thus, in cases like
Lorain Journal" and Otter Tail,45 courts struck down exclusionary con-
duct even though there was no demonstrable effect on price or output.
The Supreme Court noted in Lorain Journal that "the antitrust laws are
as much violated by the prevention of competition as by its destruc-
tion."4
The leading antitrust treatise agrees. Areeda and Hovenkamp argue
that courts concerned about monopoly power do not and should not de-
mand "a clear and genuine chain of causation from exclusionary act to
the presence of monopoly." The burden is too high, with the result that
monopoly power will wrongfully be allowed to persist. Rather, they ar-
gue the monopolist should be faulted when it attempts "conduct other
than competition on the merits, or other than restraints reasonably
'necessary' to competition on the merits, that reasonably appear capable
of making a significant contribution to creating or maintaining monop-
oly power."
The specifics of the Commission's recent cases lead one back to the
basic policy question: Does it make sense for antitrust to play a signifi-
cant role in preventing the entrenchment of monopoly power in a high-
tech industry? The answer clearly is yes. Where a monopolist's conduct
is directed at chilling independent and competing innovation in markets
where competition is defined by innovation, the argument for antitrust
action is stronger, not weaker. It is usually very difficult to undo the
effects of a scheme to monopolize after it has occurred. It would be
even more difficult to undo a successful attempt to stifle innovation. If
the antitrust laws are concerned with ensuring a continued pace of inno-
vation in high-tech industries, then it is particularly appropriate that the
enforcement agencies be able to stop practices that are of the type that
43. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 488 (1992) (J.
Scalia, dissenting).
44. See Lorain Journal, 342 U.S. at 153.
45. See United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 417 U.S. 901 (1974).
46. See Lorain Journal, 342 U.S. at 154 n.7 (quoting United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S.
100, 107 (1947)).
47. 3 AREEDA &. HOVENKAMNP, supra note 26, 651, at 77.
48. Id. at 78.
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are likely to stifle innovation and thus cement monopoly power before
the harm actually occurs.
IV. CONCLUSION
Applying the antitrust laws to high-tech industries is important in
order to secure for consumers the benefits of the innovation that drives
economic growth. Neither the rate of innovation in those industries nor
the pervasiveness of intellectual property rights is an argument for anti-
trust enforcers to withdraw. Instead, these are characteristics to be taken
into account, as the special characteristics of every industry and every
market are taken into account in antitrust analysis. Through careful,
mainstream, but vigorous law enforcement, the Commission and the
Antitrust Division can ensure that competition will remain as a spur to
innovation and a boon to consumers.
